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I. INTRODUCTION
As the push to cut costs, clear dockets, and expedite the judicial process
continues, alternative dispute resolution (ADR) has begun to permeate
virtually every area of law, with one major exception: Criminal Law. An
obvious explanation for this is the increased constitutional and statutory
assurances that criminal defendants have regarding access to courts and
juries. However, this explanation ignores that criminal justice today is, for
the most part, a system of pleas, not a system of trials.1 Because criminal
defendants often waive many of the assurances and rights to which they are
entitled, there is no reason criminal law should not also be able to benefit
from ADR to the same extent as other areas of law. In fact, the United States
military has been officially engaging in a form of ADR for settling minor
criminal misconduct outside the judicial system since before 195 1.2 It is time
for states to take a lesson from the Services.
States should adopt a quasi-arbitration form of nonjudicial punishment
akin to that in Article 15 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) 3 to
deal with criminal cases involving misdemeanor offenses.4 The UCMJ is the
federal criminal code that governs military personnel and U.S. civilians
supporting the military under some circumstances.5 Article 15 of the UCMJ
* Kaleb L. McHale, TSgt, USAFR, Juris Doctor Candidate, 2015, The Ohio State
University Moritz College of Law. Special thanks to Maj. Joshua Grissom, USAFR, for
assisting with the selection of this note topic and for the support along the way.
1 See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012).
2 See 10 U.S.C.A. § 815. See also Burress M. Camahan, Comment-Article 15
Punishments, 13 A.F. L. REV. 270, 271 (1971), for a discussion on the ways in which the
military employed a similar, albeit illegal, form of nonjudicial punishment prior to that date.
3 Carnahan, supra note 2, at 271.
4 See Model Penal Code § 1.04, for purposes of this analysis, a misdemeanor offense
is one defined as such in the governing jurisdiction or for which the governing statute
provides that persons convicted thereof may be sentenced to imprisonment for a term of
which the maximum is less than one year.
5 See 10 U.S.C.A. § 802 (amended in 2009). Congress revised Article 2 of the
UCMJ making civilians accompanying the military in the field in times of declared war
or a contingency operation subject to the UCMJ.
147
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
allows commanders in the military to impose nonjudicial punishment on their
subordinates to provide swift, efficient justice.6 The Article 15 process
avoids the judicial system and allows a recipient to choose this forum to state
his case in front of his commander or his commander's authorized delegate
and to accept accompanying punishment in lieu of being tried in a court-
martial, although the individual is still given the opportunity to appeal the
commander's decision.7
The organization of this mechanism in a state setting would necessarily
have some logistical differences. 8 While one justification for the use of the
Article 15 process is military necessity, a state system similar to the one used
by the military could be just as effective and would be justified by states'
interest in delivering swift, efficient justice and by the time and cost savings
it provides to the criminal justice system, thus freeing up limited judicial
resources that could then be diverted to more important or serious offenders.
This note will first discuss in section II why a change is necessary in
today's criminal justice system. Unlike the military, the civilian sector has not
yet developed an effective method of diverting minor offenses in such a way as
to not "clog" the rest of the system, and it has resulted in an inefficient system
that has choked judicial resources. Section III then discusses the military
process and some of the practical choices states choosing to adopt such a
process would face. It then outlines baseline procedural characteristics a state's
program should have, extrapolated from the military's systems. Next, it briefly
examines critiques of the nonjudicial punishment process in general and, for the
most part, explains why such concerns would be quelled by the process's
application in a state context. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, section IV
explains why the nonjudicial punishment process-as applied to the states-
would be constitutional.
6 See 10 U.S.C.A. § 815.
7 The appeal authority is typically the next higher commander in the chain of
command. See 10 U.S.C.A. § 815.
8 Civilians do not have a commander to whom they are responsible, so it would be
necessary to set up a system that allows for this mechanism.
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II. AN EVALUATION OF THE CURRENT STATE OF THE PLEA BARGAINING
PROCESS EXPOSES A NEED FOR CHANGE IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM9
The threshold question is why any change should be made at all to the
status quo. This question is fair because, after all, states technically use ADR
in Criminal Law.10 In fact, in Ohio, only 2.5 percent of criminal cases in
common pleas courts were resolved by going to trial in 2012, with similar
statistics in municipal courts, which are responsible for hearing misdemeanor
cases contemplated in the scope of this note.11 Other states post similar
numbers for settling criminal cases as well. Litigation as an answer to
criminal misconduct is no longer the norm, but rather a last resort. Compared
to other areas of law then, perhaps Criminal Law is not an "outlier" in the
sense that it does not employ ADR at all, but rather in the manner in which it
employs ADR. 12
Although the current system for dealing with misdemeanor offenses
results in the majority of defendants never seeing a jury trial, this does not
9 For purposes of this note, plea bargaining refers to:
[A]ny bargaining, negotiation, or discussion between a criminal defendant,
or his or her counsel, and a prosecuting attorney or judge, whereby the
defendant agrees to plead guilty or nolo contendere, in exchange for any
promises, commitments, concessions, assurances, or consideration by the
prosecuting attorney or judge relating to any charge against the defendant or to
the sentencing of the defendant.
Cal. Penal Code § 1192.7 (West 2012).
10 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). "Alternative dispute resolution" is
"A procedure for settling a dispute by means other than litigation . . Id. Under this
broad definition, anything short of litigation qualifies.
11 John Futty, Trials a Rarity in Ohio, U.S., THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Jan. 13,
2014.
12 Rather than defining ADR in the way the way that Black's Law Dictionary does,
those more intimately familiar tend to characterize it by its components, rather than
simply by the absence of litigation.
In an effort to avoid the delay, expense, technicality, and acrimony of traditional
judicial litigation, a movement has emerged for parties to use forms of alternative dispute
resolution (ADR). In these processes, the parties typically agree to submit their disputes
before a private third-party neutral, who would either decide, as in arbitration, or
facilitate, as in mediation, a resolution of the parties' disputes.
Maureen A. Weston, Checks on Participant Conduct in Compulsory ADR:
Reconciling the Tension in the Need for Good-Faith Participation, Autonomy, and
Confidentiality, 76 IND. L.J. 591, 592 (2001).
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mean that ADR is being implemented in an effective or fair manner. The
current strategy of dealing with criminal defendants suspected of committing
a misdemeanor offense looks very much like a different form of ADR than
mediation or arbitration, which both involve a third-party neutral: It looks
simply like a negotiation. While negotiations are surely a quicker way of
disposing of cases than going through a trial, this is not necessarily the most
efficient and certainly not the fairest way of doing so.
First, it cannot be fairly said that those in the negotiation are on the same
footing in terms of power. Because of the inherent disparity in power, and
because the prosecutor essentially holds all the cards-except perhaps in
unique cases-the idea that the parties are involved in meaningful
negotiations seems suspicious and is worth briefly discussing. When a person
is arrested on suspicion of a misdemeanor offense, that person may or may
not spend the night in jail awaiting a bond hearing. Often, for minor offenses,
the defendant will be allowed to depart on his own recognizance. 13
Conversely, the judge may set bail, and the defendant would be responsible
for posting bail or waiting in jail until the court date. At some point before
the court date, the prosecutor and defendant often negotiate a plea deal that
results in the defendant signing an agreement whereby the defendant
essentially exchanges a guilty plea--either to the charged offenses, or some
lesser offense agreed to by the prosecutor-for the terms offered by the
prosecutor. They will then bring the plea in front of a judge on the scheduled
date, and the judge will either provide or withhold his permission to progress
with the plea bargain.
The power disparity arises because a defendant's only bargaining chip is
his guilty plea. Conversely, the prosecutor has wide prosecutorial discretion
to make deals with defendants, and judges often acquiesce to the terms of
these agreements. 14 Additionally, the prosecutor's position affords him or her
a great deal of information power.15 The prosecutor has access to the facts of
the case and has an intimate familiarity with the law that the defendant does
not possess. 16 Additionally, the prosecutor possesses positional power, which
13 Often referred to as a "PR Bond."
14 Presumably, the role of the judge would be to ensure that the defendant's rights
have not been violated, especially that the defendant made the agreement of his own free
will.
15 Informational power essentially refers to superior access to information or simply
expertise. For a discussion of information power in negotiations, see Robert S. Adler &
Elliot M. Silverstein, When David Meets Goliath: Dealing with Power Diferentials in
Negotiations, 5 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 1, 26 (2000).
16 The calculus might change somewhat when counsel, who presumably has the
same degree of knowledge regarding the law, represents the defendant.
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the average criminal defendant does not. 17 Finally, for the prosecutor,
negotiations of this type are commonplace, whereas the criminal defendant
often is dealing for the first time with the criminal justice system and thus
lacks familiarity with it. The unsurprising result is the very high rate of
settlements that occur from plea negotiations.
In order to be successful, a program would need to address the fairness
aspect of plea negotiations while still maintaining the increased efficiency
over litigation that plea bargains offer. Additionally, it would need to
conserve judicial resources in a way superior to that of normal plea-
bargaining, while still recognizing the need for a third-party neutral's
involvement in the process. Finally, it would need to not infringe upon the
Accused's constitutional rights-namely a criminal defendant's right to a
jury trial and his right to counsel.
III. STATES SHOULD USE THE FEATURES OF THE MILITARY'S
NONJUDICIAL PUNISHMENT PROCESS AS A GUIDE18
The nonjudicial process being used in the military offers exactly the
aforementioned features. A person suspected of committing an offense and
being considered for nonjudicial punishment in the military is first given
notice. He is informed of the charges for which he is under suspicion, and he
is then advised of his rights. 19 The Accused makes a number of elections,
including whether he will consult with counsel and whether he wishes to
waive his right to a trial, which means accepting nonjudicial punishment as
binding on him-notwithstanding the right to appeal-or electing not to
participate in this alternative method of resolving the suspected misconduct,
at which point the nonjudicial process would end. 20 The office of the Staff
17 In this context, position power refers to the authority the prosecutor has, a
prosecutor's social position relative to the average criminal defendant, and that is
associated with the prosecutor because of his relationship with the court and its
accompanying authority. For a discussion on position power, see Omer Shapira,
Exploring the Concept of Power in Mediation: Mediators' Sources of Power and
Influence Tactics, 24 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 535, 549 (2009).
18 While each branch of service has slight variations in the nonjudicial punishment
process, unless the differences are notable they are not addressed. For the sake of
concision, illustrations will be limited to the context of the Air Force.
19 In the Air Force, the commander schedules an appointment for the Accused with
the defense counsel, and the Accused may elect not to consult with his provided counsel
if he so chooses. See generally DEP'T OF THE AIR FORCE, Air Force Instruction 51-202
[hereinafter AFI 51-202].
20 AFI51-202, supra, note 19 at13.20,. See also 10 U.S.C.A. § 815.
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Judge Advocate (SJA) would then be notified, and court-martial charges
would then typically be pursued against the Accused. 21 The Accused also
elects at this point whether he wishes to present any written matters for
consideration, whether he requests a personal appearance in front of the
Commander, and whether he would like the appearance to be private or
public.22
This process benefits the Accused because a third-party neutral hears his
case-similar to a bench trial-although without some of the procedural
protections afforded the defendant in those cases and typically in more of an
expedited manner without expending judicial resources. Similar to plea-
bargaining, the punishments available under the nonjudicial process are
generally less severe than the maximum punishment if the Accused elected to
have his case tried in court and was found guilty. 23 Unlike the plea-
bargaining process, however, imposing nonjudicial punishment upon the
Accused does not burden the Accused with a criminal history, which is
probably one of the most notable features of the nonjudicial process. 24 It is
also one of the reasons that this ADR system should not replace, but only
augment the portion of the criminal justice system that deals with
misdemeanor offenses.
Because such a device contemplates state adoption, the extent to which
each state adopts the process will differ from state to state. Accordingly, one
of the major issues to be decided would be to what extent nonjudicial
punishment is available to the state's residents. The military offers
nonjudicial punishment to essentially all of its members, although the
punishment available to officers is different than those offered to enlisted
members. 25 States would likely face a few different options: First, they could
21 The decision whether to pursue charges is in the commander's discretion. See
AFI51-202, supra, note 19 at, 3.21. The SJA's office serves many functions, including
that of prosecutor, which would be the function it would serve at this point in the process.22 AFI51-202, supra, note 19.
23 Compare DEP'T OF THE AIR FORCE, Manual for Courts-Martial, Part V para. 5.,
United States (2012) [hereinafter MCM] with Manual for Courts-Martial, Part II, Ch. X,
United States (2012). The constitutionality of this phenomenon will be discussed in a
subsequent section of this note.
24 AFI 51-202, supra, note 19 at 11.1.
25 See MCM, supra note 23 at Part V para. 5. There are vast differences between the
responsibilities of Officers and Enlisted members in the Armed Forces, although the
difference in entrance requirements is based primarily on the level of education the
individual has attained. Generally, Officers must hold an undergraduate degree, while
Enlisted members are typically only required to have a high school diploma or its
equivalent.
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base the program on the status of the offender and make the nonjudicial
punishment available only to first-time offenders or only to persons below a
certain age.26 Second, they could base the program on the status of the
offense and make nonjudicial punishment available only for specific
misdemeanor offenses. 27 Finally, states could make the program available to
all offenders of all misdemeanor offenses. However, among any of these
options, the Administrator,28 or prosecutor, may determine that nonjudicial
punishment is inappropriate for the offender based on the offender's criminal
history or other factors surrounding the circumstances. 29
Article 15 of the UCMJ gives discretion to the secretaries of the services
in many areas regarding how to run the nonjudicial punishment process. 30
States should also exercise such broad discretion in crafting their nonjudicial
punishment programs, but in doing so, the programs of each of the services
will be instructive, as each contains slight differences, reflecting both the
realities of their military missions-which must be taken into account-as
well as their differing views on individual rights.
There are some common elements among the services, which serve to
26 At least some states have programs available to first time offenders that allow the
offender to plead guilty and then fulfill certain obligations in order to get record of the
offense expunged from their criminal record. The difference between nonjudicial
punishment and such existing programs is that this proposed program would reduce the
costs of supervision. Specifically, rather than requiring the defendant to take affirmative
action, the defendant would agree ahead of time to be bound by an agreement entered
into with the state, which he would then be required to fulfill. Should the Accused fail to
fulfill such requirements, he would be held answerable to law enforcement. There would
be no need to engage in the bureaucratic practices that are currently practiced in
expunging one's record.
27 States may decide that certain classes of misdemeanor offenses are too severe for
one reason or another to allow a defendant an opportunity to get only the immediate
punishment, rather than the stigma that a conviction (or criminal record) carries with it.
28 Because such a system would operate separate from, but alongside, the judicial
system, states would need to appoint an administrator over the process. This
administrator would act in the same capacity as commanders do in the military and
decide whether nonjudicial punishment would be appropriate on an individual basis. In
doing so, the Administrator would be required to review all evidence and make a
determination as to whether the evidence supported the offense for which punishment
was being considered. Additionally, administrators would determine the nature and type
of punishment appropriate based on the circumstances.
29 Including prior misdemeanor offenses for which the Accused received nonjudicial
punishment; although this would not be a part of an individual's criminal history,
evidence of prior nonjudicial punishment would be useful in determining whether it is
appropriate in the current instance of misconduct.
30 10 U.S.C.A. § 815.
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provide an understanding of where states should begin. 31 Although if
adopted, many aspects of the states' processes will necessarily look different
than those of the military, these common elements may be seen as the
backbone of the military nonjudicial system, which is important because,
among other reasons, the military's procedure has not been found
unconstitutional.
A. Nonjudicial Punishment Recipients Should Receive a Preliminary Inquiry
As a fundamental element of the process, in that it affords some due
process to the person accused of wrongdoing, states should maintain the
preliminary inquiry, although their version would differ substantially from
that of the military and, accordingly, would actually be less important.
Commanders in the military must conduct an investigation into alleged
offenses to determine whether nonjudicial punishment is appropriate.
Circumstances surrounding nonjudicial punishment are diverse, and
instances in which nonjudicial punishment is appropriate arise in numerous
types of situations in the military.
Often, commanders receive third-party reports of misconduct in which
the service member was allegedly engaged, on or off duty. The third party
making the report could be a law enforcement agency that apprehended the
member for some wrongdoing, but other times it could be a coworker that
witnessed, or otherwise learned of, the member engaging in proscribed
behavior and ultimately brought it to the attention of the commander in
charge of the alleged wrongdoer.
Because chargeable misconduct is different in the states than it is in the
military, and because states do not have an environment that tends to foster
the reporting of misconduct in the same way as the military, state
administrators would likely rely primarily, if not exclusively, on law
enforcement agencies to bring forth evidence of the misconduct that would
serve as the basis for which those being offered nonjudicial punishment are
accused. 32 An inquiry launched by the commander, in the absence of a police
31 DAVID A. SCHLUETER, MILITARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE,
143-44 (8th ed., Matthew Bender 2012) (including a preliminary inquiry, notice, hearing,
and appeals).
32 A significant distinction between a military member and a civilian is that a
military member has specific duties, orders, and regulations he must follow, the
dereliction of which may be a criminal offense under the UCMJ. 10 U.S.C.A. § 892
(2014). Because of this important distinction, it is likely that there would rarely be a case
in which someone besides a law enforcement agency would bring evidence of
wrongdoing to an administrator, although in rare instances an Administrator may be
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investigation, could include appointing an investigating officer to investigate
the underlying details of an accusation. However, when a competent police
agency has conducted the investigation, there is often no reason to pursue an
inquiry further. Of course, evidence and other matters submitted by the
Offeree will be considered as part of the inquiry into the matter, hence
rendering the preliminary inquiry indispensable. Only after this inquiry is
complete-to whatever extent it is conducted or required-should the
administrator decide whether nonjudicial punishment is warranted.
B. Nonjudicial Punishment Recipients Should Receive Notice
Another indispensable part of the process is the notice afforded to the
party being offered nonjudicial punishment. This aspect of the process also
touches on the due process requirements to which the party is entitled. While
due process is flexible and is dictated by the demands of the situation, 33
examining the methods by which the services provide due process is a useful
starting point.34
Each of the services has a device by which it provides the Offeree with
written notice. 35 While each service differs slightly in the content of the
notice given to the Offeree, each gives at least the following: the alleged
offenses the Offeree committed; the right to demand trial;36 the right to
consult with counsel;37 the right to have an open, or public, hearing; the right
to the assistance of a spokesperson; and the right to examine available
made aware of misconduct through other sources, such as witnesses to the alleged
misconduct.
33 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976).
34 This note does not contemplate the full scope of due process concerns; that is, it
does not purport to identify the minimum sufficient due process requirements. While a
balancing under Mathews would be a useful place to begin, it is beyond the scope of this
note. It should be noted, however, that although specific due process requirements are not
identified herein, there is some level of process that would allow the administration of
this system.
35 The U.S. Army (Army) has both a summarized and formal process; in the
summarized proceedings the Offeree is given notice orally. For the remainder of this
note, only the Army's formal process will be considered.
36 This right only exists in the U.S. Navy (Navy), U.S. Marine Corps (Marines), and
the U.S. Coast Guard (Coast Guard) when the member is not attached to or embarked in a
vessel.
37 The right to consult with counsel is guaranteed in both the Army and Air Force,
but it only exists in the other branches when the member has the right to demand trial.
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evidence and to present evidence on his behalf.38
Accordingly, a state system of nonjudicial punishment would be well
advised to allow at least this baseline notice to ensure that due process is
satisfied. Although some of the services do not provide the right to demand
trial by court-martial or the right to consult with counsel in all cases, this can
probably be justified by military necessity. 39 Because states will not have
such a justification, advisement of these rights should occur, as they do in
those services that do not embark on vessels and thus do not have the same
claim to military necessity for those purposes. 40
C. Nonjudicial Punishment Recipients Should Receive a Hearing
In every service, the Offeree is afforded the opportunity for a hearing,
where he is allowed to present matters in defense, mitigation, or extenuation
to his commander.41 The commander will then consider both the evidence
against the Offeree and the evidence presented by the Offeree. After the
commander's decision, the Offeree is informed both of the decision and of
the punishment.
After punishment has occurred, the subject of nonjudicial punishment
then has the right to appeal the commander's decision. 42 While the
procedures differ slightly among the services, they follow the same basic
approach. The member has five days to appeal, in writing, to the next higher
commander if he feels the punishment was either excessive or unjust.43 There
is no required format, other than that it is in writing, neither are there specific
requirements the appellant must submit to be considered.44 The appeal is first
routed through the commander who imposed the punishment, and that
commander has a number of options available upon receipt of an appeal,
including suspension, mitigation, remission, or setting aside the punishment.
38 SCHLUETER, supra note 31, at 145.
39 See JOINT SERV. COMM. ON MILITARY JUSTICE, supra, note 23 at Part V para. 5.
See also Weiss v. U.S., 510 U.S. 163, 177 (1994) (recognizing that due process differs
with the military context).
40 The Air Force is the outlier in providing counsel free of charge to all those being
offered nonjudicial punishment. States could develop standards for providing public
defenders to certain parties being offered nonjudicial punishment.
41 In the event the commander is unavailable, a representative may hear the matters
and present the commander with a summary of the content therein. AFI 51-202, supra,
note 19 at 18.
42 See JOINT SERV. COMM. ON MILITARY JUSTICE, supra, note 23 at Part V para. 5.
43 Id
44 Id
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The commander may not increase the punishment.45
If the commander imposing punishment does anything but grant the
appeal in full, 46 the appeal is then routed through the legal office to the next
higher commander-along with all evidence considered by the commander
prior to imposition of punishment-who has the same options the imposing
commander had. 47 Whether the commander denies, grants in part, or grants
in full the member's appeal, this commander is the final appeal authority, and
the military provides the member with no further recourse.48
Hearings and appeals in a state system would be essentially identical to
those of the military with just a few differences. First, the administrators of
state-run systems would have no familiarity with the recipient of nonjudicial
punishment. While this might, at first, seem to be quite significant, closer
inspection reveals that, if anything, this would tend to make the system fairer.
Depending on the size of a unit, the commander may or may not have met
the person subject to nonjudicial punishment and accordingly may or may
not be familiar with him personally or professionally.49 If the commander has
not met the individual, it is likely he will talk to the alleged offender's
supervisors to inquire about him; he will also review his performance reports,
which will inform him as to the efficacy of the work that person has
performed for the military. The reason for these differences is easily
explained.
Despite its name, one purpose of "nonjudicial punishment" in the
military is rehabilitation.50 Generally, states have varying reasons for
imposing punishment on offenders. 51 Depending on the states' underlying
rationale behind their punishment of criminal actions, the familiarity the
administrator has with the alleged offender may be a negative or a positive
45 Id.
46 I.e., denies or grants in part.
47 See JOINT SERV. COMM. ON MILITARY JUSTICE, supra note 23 at Part V para. 5.
48 Id
49 The word "unit" is used to describe the level of command that is typically
commanded by a commander exercising nonjudicial punishment authority-each service
uses different terminology (e.g., this level is called a "squadron" in the Air Force).
50 See JOINT SERV. COMM. ON MILITARY JUSTICE, supra, note 23 at Part V para. I
(stating that one purpose of nonjudicial punishment is to "promote[] positive behavior
changes in service members without the stigma of a court-martial conviction.").
51 There are two basic rationales behind criminal punishment: Retributive and
Utilitarian. The Retributive rationale imposes upon offenders their just deserts, while the
Utilitarian rationale focuses on the utility the punishment may confer upon the individual
or to society.
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factor. 52 On the one hand, when the administrator is highly familiar with the
alleged offender, as he is in some circumstances in the military, the
administrator is better positioned to determine how best to rehabilitate that
individual.53
On the other hand, lack of familiarity with the Offeree provides another
layer of impartiality not often present in the military. Accordingly, if the
primary purpose of punishment is retributive-giving to the offender his just
desserts for engaging in the criminal misconduct-this impartiality is
beneficial. It allows the unbiased finder of fact to impartially judge the
evidence against the individual in determining his guilt. The individual
would still be able to submit matters in mitigation on his own behalf,
enabling the administrator to impartially administer an appropriate
punishment based on the facts and the circumstances rather than some
potentially inappropriate basis. 54
D. The Appropriate Standard ofProof in the Military and the Proposed State
System is Beyond a Reasonable Doubt
Generally, the preliminary inquiry is the point at which the commander
determines whether nonjudicial punishment would be appropriate for the
individual in question. Assuming the commander determines it is
appropriate, the process will move forward. The. question of standard of
proof for evidence becomes relevant at this point, and again after the Offeree
submits matters to the commander for consideration.
Although the Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM) is silent on standard of
proof, it is argued and widely accepted by the military that the acceptable
burden of proof is "beyond a reasonable doubt." This makes sense because, if
a person suspected of misconduct turns down the nonjudicial punishment, the
Office of the SJA would be required to prove each element of the crime in a
court-martial beyond a reasonable doubt.55 Although not all branches of the
military provide legal counsel free of charge, the person's right to confer
52 It is doubtful that whether marginally positive or negative, the impact of
familiarity with the accused will be substantial.
53 It is common in the military for a commander to impose a suspended sentence,
which can be viewed as a form of probation, in that the suspended punishment does not
become effective until and unless the individual engages in further misconduct.
54 E.g., The administrator's subjective belief that the individual will or will not
engage again in similar misconduct due to the person's character.
55 See generally, Captain Shane Reeves, The Burden of Proof in Nonjudicial
Punishment: Why Beyond A Reasonable Doubt Makes Sense, 2005 Nov. ARMY LAw 28
(2005). See alsoAFI51-202,supra note 19 at 15.
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with counsel helps ensure that the proper standard of proof is being utilized.
An additional safeguard is that, in the military, nonjudicial punishment is
routed through the legal office, and an attorney is responsible for reviewing
each action taken. 56
Because states will have the opportunity to address this issue head on at
the adoption of the mechanism, they should expressly adopt beyond a
reasonable doubt as the standard. Despite no formal adoption of this in the
military, each branch has come to the same conclusion, and expressly
adopting such a standard can only strengthen the legitimacy of this type of
program. Moreover, it would be even more probable to provide legitimacy
because a neutral administrator would often be in a better position to weigh
evidence in an impartial manner in a way that may not be possible for
commanders under some circumstances.
E. Although Some Realities in the Civilian Context Make Punishments
Available to the Military Unavailable, Many of the Military's Methods
have Parallel Civilian Counterparts that Provide States with a Starting
Point
These forms of punishment available to the military are instructive for
state-implementation and, for the most part, have parallel functions to those
already available in the states, with some apparent exceptions. The forms of
punishment available to each branch in the military are virtually identical. 57
They include correctional custody for not more than thirty consecutive
days;58 forfeiture of not more than one-half of one month's pay per month for
two months; 59 reduction in grade;60 extra duties for not more than forty-five
56 AFI 51-202, supra note 19 at 34. While these military attorneys do not represent
the Accused, their client is their respective branch of the military. Their review helps
ensure that the nonjudicial punishments are legally sufficient; should an incident arise
where a commander wishes to impose nonjudicial punishment on a member where the
evidence simply would not support the charges, an attorney from the legal office would
advise against. This is because, if (or presumably when) the Accused turns down the
nonjudicial punishment that was based on something less than probable cause, the SJA's
Office would not be able to successfully prosecute the Accused, and thus their office
maintains an interest in utilizing a higher standard of proof.
57 The divergence occurring among services where the punishment is imposed upon
a person attached to or embarked in a vessel; accordingly, the additional punishments
allowed under these circumstances will not be considered here.
58 10 U.S.C.A. § 815 (b)(2)(H)(ii) (2014).
59 Id. at (b)(2)(H)(iii).
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consecutive days;61 and restriction to specified limits, with or without
suspension from duties, for not more than sixty consecutive days.62
Because every member of the military serves in a specific grade, a
punishment allowing for reduction is appropriate; this, of course, is not the
case outside the military context and is therefore inapplicable. Forfeiture of
pay is a device that is used to garner wages from the Accused through
automatic withholding from their paycheck. While this is also not a realistic
punishment, the state could simply fine the Accused. The military imposes
the punishment of extra duty to cause the Accused to work additional hours
either at his own job or doing some form of work that usually benefits the
installation on which he works. States could punish some offenders by
requiring a certain reasonable number of hours of community service.
Additionally, the military uses both correctional custody and restriction to
specified limits as a punishment. While correctional custody would not be
available in the civilian context, restriction to specified limits could be
possible. This might take the form of house arrest, allowing for the individual
to leave only for specified purposes63 or some other geographically specified
area in which the person must remain.
One additional administrative function the military has at its disposal that
would not be available to the states deals with the actions upon which
nonjudicial punishment often serves as the basis. For instance, members of
the military who receive nonjudicial punishment are oftentimes
administratively discharged 64-based on the commander's
recommendation-and the nonjudicial punishment serves as a sort of
justification for either the discharge itself, the characterization of the
601d. at (b)(2)(H)(iv). The number of grades an Accused may be reduced is
contingent upon his own rank and that of the Commander, but it is unhelpful to consider
this further in this note.
61 Id. at (b)(2)(H)(v).
62 Id. at (b)(2)(H)(vi). In the military, the authorized punishment depends on the
grade of the commander imposing punishment, as well as that of the Accused; these are
the maximum punishments allowed based on the Commander being a sufficiently high
grade to administer them. Because neither the grade of the commander nor the accused is
pertinent to civilian application, it will not be further discussed in this note.
63 For example, they could leave for employment, school, taking children to and
from school, etc.
64 Military members have a contract for a number of years that is terminable
essentially when the commander has good cause to discharge that member-this can be
based on one-time more serious misconduct or it could be a pattern of misconduct that is
relatively less serious.
160
[Vol. 30:1 2014]
IMPROVING ADR IN THE STATES' CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
member's service, or both.65 Accordingly, because this type of device is not
available to them, states would not be subject to accusations that they were
flouting the intent of lawmakers that a specific set of collateral consequences
follows convictions for certain illegal acts.
As discussed earlier, the punishments actually utilized by the states
would probably vary based on the underlying purpose of that punishment.
Accordingly, a state that leans more toward rehabilitation of the offender
might dole out punishments differently than one that viewed the primary
function of punishment as retribution. Additionally, depending on how the
state designed the device, the administrator might have wide latitude to
determine the proper punishment based on a totality of the circumstances, to
include the accused's background. Alternatively, the system could be
designed such that particular offenses required particular punishment.66
F. Despite Critiques of the Nonjudicial Process, it Remains a Viable
Option for States and is Actually Improved Through State Adoption
Like anything else of this nature, nonjudicial punishment has its critics.67
First, there is an underlying concern that as alternative dispute resolution
becomes more prevalent-especially in criminal law-social justice will tend
to decline as a result of certain problems of public concern being "funneled"
into ADR. 68 Indeed, at least one critic has pointed out that nonjudicial
65 Additionally, when a member is honorably discharged, that member is entitled to
the benefits conferred on him due to his service in the military. A general discharge-
which, for example, occurs when the member receives nonjudicial punishment for drug
use and is subsequently administratively discharged-precludes that member from
reaping some of the veterans' benefits associated with serving the military honorably-
most notably G.I. Bill benefits. See Major Marshall L. Wilde, Incomplete Justice:
Unintended Consequences of Military Nonjudicial Punishment, 60 A.F. L. REv. 115, 139
(2007).
66 Fairness would dictate that punishment be based on a totality of the
circumstances. This is especially true under these circumstances where the accused has
not been found guilty and may not even have admitted guilt, necessarily.
67 There are two primary sources of critics: those who critique the nonjudicial
punishment process as it applies to the military, although some of the concerns critics
have become moot when a state adopts the process, as later discussed, and those who
critique the (over) use of alternative dispute resolution, specifically in the criminal justice
system.
68 See Andre R. Imbrogno, Using ADR to Address Issues of Public Concern: Can
ADR Become an Instrument for Social Oppression?, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 855,
877 (1999).
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punishment in the military deprives the public and third parties-namely,
victims--of substantial justice. 69
The first concern is one that deals more with issues, such as domestic
violence, being diverted to mediation before allowing them to progress to the
court-system. This phenomenon can indeed be characterized as troubling;
however, this nonjudicial punishment device, which can be fairly compared
to arbitration, presents none of the same problems as shifting from criminal
prosecution to mediation. The complaint is that a whole segment of society-
women suffering domestic violence-may be prevented from obtaining
justice.
Nonjudicial punishment, however, contemplates nothing of the sort.
There are essentially three parties who must acquiesce to a
defendant/accused being offered nonjudicial punishment: the administrator,
the prosecutor, and the defendant/accused. If either the administrator or
prosecutor does not see fit to offer the defendant nonjudicial punishment, the
defendant will face criminal prosecution for the misconduct. Additionally,
the defendant has the right to turn down the offer of nonjudicial punishment
and proceed to trial. The reason this distinction is important is because, first,
a victim suffering injury at the hands of the offender would be able to make a
statement, and that statement would then be available for the administrator to
consider. 70 Additionally, it should be noted that the only offenses for which a
domestic abuser could potentially receive nonjudicial punishment are
misdemeanor offenses, so a crime involving substantial violence would
typically not fall into this category. 71
The argument against nonjudicial punishment in the military is
essentially that the public and any potential victims, as well as the Treasury,
are deprived of substantial justice when the offense is one of a number of
categories: domestic violence, drug cases, and driving while intoxicated.72
69 See Wilde, supra note 65 at 119.
70 In this circumstance, the victim is actually better protected in a sense because a
statement made to the police could still be considered by the administrator without
requiring the victim to testify. This would be possible in this case because the rules of
evidence do not apply to nonjudicial punishment.
71 This may also be an example of a class of misdemeanor that some states would
choose to exempt from nonjudicial punishment consideration. Even if they did not, the
administrator and prosecutor would still maintain discretion over whether nonjudicial
punishment was appropriate under the circumstances, and this would conceivably result
in nonjudicial punishment not being offered in many cases of domestic violence, as the
punishment is admittedly lighter.
72 See Wilde, supra note 65, at 117-119. The author recognizes that: 1) serious
offenses will not be dealt with by nonjudicial punishment and 2) other strictly military-
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There is a concern that where domestic violence cases are disposed of
through nonjudicial punishment, families of the accused are not adequately
protected. In many states, when a person is convicted of a domestic violence
offense, a prohibition against carrying firearms is triggered. However, when
a person is given nonjudicial punishment in the military for such an offense,
this prohibition is not triggered.
This concern is no longer present when nonjudicial punishment is taken
outside the military context. First, statutes requiring this prohibition may be
conditioned upon a conviction of a crime, a requirement that nonjudicial
punishment given in the military would not fulfill. Second, often there is a
lack of reporting from the military (federal system) to the states, so even if it
did fulfill the requirement, policing these individuals would likely be
inconsistent at best.73 Both of these issues are resolved by state adoption of a
nonjudicial punishment. Of course, there would be no federal/state
communication problem, as the federal government is taken out of the mix.
Additionally, because states would be adopting the system as a whole, they
could adopt language in the appropriate statutes to allow nonjudicial
punishment to trigger these prohibitions.74
The arguments for both drug violations and driving while intoxicated
cases are similar to that of domestic violence in that they involve concern
over collateral "punishment" of the offender usually associated with
committing a certain type of offense.75 Again, this concern is unfounded in
the state adoption context where, assuming states decided to adopt the
process itself, they could also adopt/amend legislation mandating a similar
effect for those who accept nonjudicial punishment for certain offenses. 76
A final concern of nonjudicial punishment in the military is that
restitution is not available for victims. Whether states should maintain this
related misconduct-such as showing up late for duty on a regular basis or failing show
up all-does not implicate social injustice.
73 The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and the Privacy Act of 1974 shield the
military from disclosing records of nonjudicial punishment. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2009); 5
U.S.C. § 552 (2010).
74 Second Amendment concerns are beyond the scope of this note, but would require
analysis on this point.
75 For instance, a person arrested for DWI on a military installation and offered
nonjudicial punishment typically results only in a suspension of "on-base" driving
privileges rather than a suspension of the accused's state driver's license.
76 What is unclear is whether those accused of these offenses and offered nonjudicial
punishment, with the understanding that it would result automatically in the collateral
"punishment" here contemplated, would reduce in any meaningful number those that turn
down nonjudicial punishment and elect to take their chances in the judicial system.
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feature of nonjudicial punishment should be examined before adoption,
although in-depth consideration of this matter is beyond the scope of this
note.77
After each state determines whether and to what extent nonjudicial
punishment will be available to its citizens, the arguably less difficult step of
designing the system to comply with due process is required. This step is
made relatively easy by examining the nonjudicial punishment systems used
by the different branches in the military and establishing a baseline-
essentially the least common denominator used by the services-below
which states should not fall. Despite this baseline, states may well decide to
provide additional protections to its citizens, similar to each branch of service
in the military.
IV. STATE ADOPTION OF NONJUDICIAL PUNISHMENT IS
CONSTITUTIONAL 78
Because the nonjudicial punishment process contemplates depriving
persons of their liberty or property, procedural due process must be adhered
to.79 All of the other rights to which a criminal defendant is entitled in a trial
in a court of law generally are not thought to raise issues. 80 This is because
when a party is offered nonjudicial punishment, it is that party's prerogative
to either accept the nonjudicial punishment or refuse to accept it and force
the government to prosecute him as a criminal defendant, thus conferring to
him all the accompanying rights of a criminal trial. Thus, in accepting
nonjudicial punishment, the accused is advised of his right to a trial and must
expressly and knowingly waive that right, which includes waiving some of
his accompanying rights. 8'
Some have argued that the nonjudicial punishment system in the
77 The same question as to the effect that the availability of restitution would have
on those accused of misconduct accepting nonjudicial punishment applies to the
availability of other collateral punishments.
78 While the Fifth and Sixth Amendments warrant the same analysis in the federal
system (as in the military context), I will refer only to the Fourteenth Amendment in
reference to the proposed nonjudicial punishment process, as this paper deals with state
adoption of nonjudicial process and is thus more appropriate.
79 See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
80 In the military (i.e. federal) context, specifically the Fifth Amendment right to due
process, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and the Sixth Amendment right to a jury
trial.
81 See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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military, if applied to a civilian context, may be unconstitutional. 82 This
argument, however, seems to rest on two key premises: the scope of
nonjudicial punishment authority in the military and the breadth of the
offenses covered. In the military, nonjudicial punishment authority falls
generally to officers serving in command billets. Additionally, as previously
mentioned, the military punishes some offenses, which, in the civilian
context could be considered trivial in certain cases, but, even cast in their
worst light, would not be considered worthy of government sanction.83
While it is probably true that there would be constitutional problems with
state adoption of a scheme identical to that of the military, those issues are
not raised here because nonjudicial punishment authority would be held by a
relative few who are not part of the judicial process-the administrators
empowered by the jurisdictions in which they serve. Additionally, the
misconduct upon which nonjudicial punishment could be based would not be
substantially extended, as in the military, to include conduct that was
traditionally not addressable by the courts. The process contemplated in this
paper is one that would, at least in the constitutionally significant ways, be
equal to the current plea bargaining process.
Another author suggested that the manner in which punishments were
imposed was unconstitutional because the United States Supreme Court in
United States v. Jackson 84 struck down as unconstitutional a death penalty
clause in the Federal Kidnapping Act that would cause a criminal defendant
to be subject to the risk of a death penalty only if they plead not guilty and
demanded a jury trial.85 The statute was unconstitutional because it "tend[ed]
to discourage" defendants from pleading not guilty and demanding a jury and
"needlessly encourage[d]" waiver of those rights. 86
However, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence has developed on this issue
since then,87 and, in Chaffin v. Stynchcombe,88 the Court summarized the
82 See Captain Harold L. Miller, A Long Look at Article 15, 28 MIL. L. REv. 37, 50
(1965).
83 See, e.g., Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 28 (1976) (Accused charged with
unauthorized absence). Other examples include reporting late for duty or falling asleep
while on the job, both of which are punishable under the UCMJ.
84 United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1970).
85 See Captain Buress, supra note 2.
86 Jackson, 390 U.S. at 583.
87 See, e.g., Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212 (1978); Santobello v. New York,
404 U.S. 257 (1971); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); Parker v. North
Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970); North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
88 Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 32 (1973).
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law regarding government discouragement of a defendant's constitutional
rights. 89 First, Jackson did not hold that every government-imposed choice
in the criminal process that discourages the exercise of constitutional rights
offends the Constitution.90 "[T]he inquiry, by its very nature, must be made
on a case-by-case basis" and "the threshold question is whether compelling
the election impairs to an appreciable extent any of the policies behind the
rights involved." 91 Finally, "waivers of constitutional rights not only must be
voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient
awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences." 92
Additionally, the Court has developed a doctrine known as the criminal
waiver doctrine. It essentially allows the criminal defendant to use the
constitutional rights guaranteed to all criminal defendants, as bargaining
chips to obtain a chance of a more favorable outcome than the defendant
believed he had prior to engaging in the plea-bargaining, so long as he does
so voluntarily and intelligently. 93 A voluntary and intelligent waiver, at least
in reference to waiving the right to counsel, only means that the defendant
must be made aware of the "dangers and disadvantages," so that, if he agrees,
he does so with his eyes open.94 The Court has often treated representation
by counsel as sufficient evidence of voluntary and intelligent waiver when a
criminal defendant waives a Constitutional right and later attempts to
challenge it, despite the minimal role the attorney may have played.
A. The Constitution Would Not Require States to Provide Counsel to Those
Being Offered Nonjudicial Punishment
If states adopt nonjudicial punishment and counsel is not provided to the
accused, it is likely to invite constitutional challenges of the procedure;
however, such challenges should fail for two reasons. "Absent a knowing and
intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether
classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by
counsel at his trial." 95 If states do not create a mechanism through which to
provide legal counsel, they will require that assistance of counsel be waived
89 Id.
90 Id. at 30.
91 Id. at 32. See also Mcgautha v. State of California, 402 U.S. 183, 213 (1971).92 Brady, 397 U.S. at 748 (citing Brockhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1 (1966).
93 See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985).
94 See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975).
95 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (2006).
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if the accused wishes to take part in nonjudicial punishment rather than the
judicial process. If the standard is knowing and voluntary and this truly
means that the person accused of wrongdoing must be made aware of the
dangers and disadvantages of pursuing the course of action he is
contemplating, this requirement is not a difficult one to fulfill and could be
easily fulfilled by a layperson. This is because the dangers and disadvantages
will, in most cases, remain constant and will not amount to anything very
threatening, due to the nature of the underlying misconduct and the process
itself.
Accordingly, the person being offered nonjudicial punishment must be
made aware that he probably will not escape punishment,96 and of course
advised of the maximum punishment that may be imposed upon him. At this
point, the dangers and disadvantages are merged into a description of what
nonjudicial punishment is and how it functions, which would be described to
the individual in the ordinary course of the process, with or without such a
requirement, in order to induce him to choose the forum over proceeding in
court. Aside from that minor complication, there is nothing to suggest that
nonjudicial punishment is any less constitutional than plea-bargaining, or that
courts would not encourage nonjudicial punishment if it were available as an
option in the same manner in which they now encourage plea-bargaining, 97
which is recognized as necessary, as well as more efficient than a jury trial in
most cases.
Second, even in the absence of waiver, the Fourteenth Amendment
would not require that counsel be provided. The Supreme Court held in
Argersinger v. Hamlin that counsel must be provided when "incarceration is
a practical possibility." 98 Because incarceration is not even a theoretical
possibility in the nonjudicial punishment context, much less a practical one,
the right to counsel is not triggered. In a concurring opinion, Justice Powell
addressed the broader issue of whether petty offenses for which no
incarceration was contemplated triggered the right to counsel and stated that
he believes the Fourteenth Amendment requires the right to counsel in petty
cases whenever assistance of counsel is necessary to assure a fair trial. 99
Even assuming this were the standard, and assuming that it could be applied
to nonjudicial punishment proceedings, which are not equivalent to a trial,
counsel would still not be required. There is a built-in fairness, in that the
96 Of course, he will escape a criminal record, which is arguably the most valuable
aspect to recipients of nonjudicial punishment.
97 See Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 219 (1978).
98 See Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 39.
99 Id. at 47 (Powell, J., concurring).
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accused must opt in and agree to be bound by the limited assortment of
punishments, with which the accused would already be familiar.
Additionally, the rules of evidence would not be in effect, thereby making it
easier for a layperson to present matters in his own defense to the
administrator for consideration. Finally, the neutral administrator must
consider all relevant evidence before making a judgment as to whether and to
what extent the accused should be punished. Accordingly, regardless of the
standard, the Constitution would not require assistance of counsel be
provided under these circumstances.
B. The Nonjudicial Punishment Recipient has no Right to a Jury Trial
The constitutional right a criminal defendant has to a jury trial is not
implicated here, and accordingly does not make unconstitutional the
proposed nonjudicial punishment process. First, not all criminal defendants
are entitled to a jury trial. Only those not involving petty offenses are
afforded that right. Whether an offense is petty is determined essentially by
looking at the authorized penalty for the offense and using it as a gauge of its
social and ethical judgments. 00 Although the outer limits of this method are
unknown, it is known that a crime carrying possible penalties up to six
months does not require a jury trial if it otherwise qualifies as a petty
offense.101
Because nonjudicial punishment does not contemplate the use of
confinement or allow punishment that nears six months, it is clear that this
requirement is not met, and, accordingly, nonjudicial punishment does not
trigger the right to a jury trial. Although some of the underlying misconduct
being charged may carry a maximum punishment exceeding six months,102
when the accused elects to accept nonjudicial punishment, he has elected it as
a forum, and, in that forum, the maximum punishment is dictated by the
maximum punishments allowed in nonjudicial punishment proceedings.
Accordingly, there will never be a right to a jury under such a scheme.
Finally, as discussed in other similar contexts, the defendant also waives his
constitutional rights when he elects the nonjudicial forum, and, so long as he
does so voluntarily and knowingly, the waiver should be effective. Thus,
100 Duncan v. State of La., 391 U.S. 145, 159 (1968). That is, there is a rebuttable
presumption that offenses punishable by six months' imprisonment or less are petty and
thus do not require a jury trial. See S. Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344, 2351
(2012) (citing Duncan, 391 U.S. at 159-162).
101 Id.
102 For example, a year for some misdemeanor charges.
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there is no constitutional issue regarding a jury trial in relation to nonjudicial
punishment.
C. Although Many Believe Military Necessity is the Constitutional
Justification for Nonjudicial Punishment in the Military, it is not
Required in the State Context
From this author's experience, it is generally assumed that the military is
allowed to have its nonjudicial punishment regime due to military necessity,
the absence of which would cause nonjudicial punishment in the military to
be constitutionally infirm. While this might be true, this argument is properly
understood as a concern for the sufficiency of due process, that is, a concern
that the system as it exists in the military would be unconstitutional but for
military necessity. But the states would not adopt the military's system
wholesale, and when key aspects of the nonjudicial punishment system are
changed, any constitutional deficiencies that may exist are cured.
The Supreme Court explained in Parker v. Levy that nonjudicial
punishment is administrative rather than judicial, and it deals with the most
minor offenses. 103 Another author, defending the constitutionality of Article
15 in the military, unwittingly analyzed the constitutionality, at least in part,
in such a way that would extend constitutionality to similar state
processes. 104 In Colten v. Kentucky,105 the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of a prosecuting scheme that required the prosecutor to try
certain cases initially in courts of limited jurisdiction in a summary bench
trial, where de novo review was available after the trial. If the appeal to the
appeals court was made for de novo review, not only could the court overturn
the lower court's ruling in the appellant's favor, but also a more severe
sentence could be given as a result of the review. 106 In upholding this
scheme, the Court emphasized the weight of the state's interest in providing a
103 Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974) (holding that articles of Uniform Code of
Military Justice authorizing court-martial for conduct unbecoming of an officer and a
gentleman and court-martial for disorders and neglects to prejudice of good order and
discipline were not unconstitutionally vague and explaining the significance of the
difference between the relationship military and civilians have with the government).
104 Edward J. Imwinkelried & Francis A. Gilligan, The Unconstitutional Burden of
Article 15: A Rebuttal, 83 YALE L.J. 534, 546-47 (1974). I will be borrowing the
applicable portion of the author's analysis to (implicitly) argue for the constitutionality
not only of the nonjudicial punishment process in the military, but also as it extends to
states that would adopt a similar process.
105 Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 105, 110 (1972).
106 Id. at 117.
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quick and "inexpensive means of disposition of charges of minor
offenses." 07 However, there were two justifications upon which the Court
based its decision: First, was the state's interest in this day of increasing
burdens on state judiciaries.108 Second, was the defendant's unconditional
right to a new trial in a superior court, unprejudiced by the proceedings or the
outcome in the inferior courts. 109
The nonjudicial process is similar to the summary courts in Colten, and
similar states that the Court notes, in that it lacks many of the same
safeguards, such as not providing for a jury,110 no recording of the
proceedings, and the lack of training on the judge's part.I1 Additionally, it is
clear that the nonjudicial punishment process would serve states' strong
interest in quickly and cheaply disposing of charges of minor offenses.
However, where the processes diverge is the availability of an absolute right
to appeal to a court for a new trial. This right is so important and prominent
in Colten because of the fact that the defendant was not provided all the
constitutional protections to which he was entitled in a trial.
Despite this divergence, however, those being offered nonjudicial
punishment do not greatly differ from those in the defendant's position in
Colten. This is because, rather than allow an appeal to a superior court for de
novo review, the nonjudicial punishment process instead provides the alleged
offender with the opportunity to opt out altogether of the nonjudicial process
and exercise his constitutional rights that must be afforded criminal
defendants. Offering this cure to otherwise unconstitutional conduct on the
front end rather than the back end to ensure the process passes constitutional
muster should not make a difference, as the defendant is provided an
opportunity to exercise his rights.112
107 Id. The authors, upon whose analysis I am building, indicated that.the analogy to
the Article 15 process in the military is immediately apparent to the two-tier system in
Colten; although perhaps apparent, there is certainly a difference worth mentioning,
discussed above-namely, the second justification for a two-tier system in Colten.
108 Id. at 114.
109 Id
110 Although the Court notes that at times a jury is not provided, even in instances in
which the defendant is entitled to one.
Ill Although administrators would presumably be trained as administrators, they
would certainly not be trained as judges.
112 Additionally, it is noteworthy that nonjudicial punishment does not put the
defendants in the awkward situation they are in under two-tier systems, as they know the
maximum punishment they may receive in nonjudicial punishment and whether it is
acceptable-which it often will be, as the maximum in a trial will frequently exceed that
of nonjudicial punishment, as it does in the military.
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Finally, it is important to note that the accused would have a right to
appeal, and, assuming an appeal system that is similar to that of the
military's, the review would be equivalent to de novo, as it would simply be
another review of all the information without deference to the administrator's
findings. However, if nothing else, Colten made clear that if the opportunity
to a trial, with all of its constitutional safeguards that the accused could
exercise, was insufficient, states could allow an absolute right to a trial when
demanded by a defendant who received nonjudicial punishment. This would
give the accused identical protection afforded to the defendant in Colten, and,
while probably not the top choice for states, would still provide an
improvement and would not likely seriously impose on judicial resources.1 13
Therefore, the absence of military necessity does not make unconstitutional
the state adoption of the slightly tailored nonjudicial punishment process.
Accordingly, state adoption of a system providing nonjudicial
punishment would not be unconstitutional. The criminal defendant's right to
a trial is not at all compromised, as the criminal defendant always has a
choice whether to accept nonjudicial punishment or take his chances in a
trial. An inquiry into the constitutionality of the device could probably end
there, but, when looked at even closer, it becomes clear that whatever
concerns are left are dealt with through other features of the device. In
addition to the defendant's waiver of both the right to a jury trial and the
right to counsel, the recipient of nonjudicial punishment is entitled to neither,
as the risk of incarceration is required to trigger any such right, and
nonjudicial punishment simply does not present such a risk.
V. CONCLUSION
In this age of settling disputes with a focus on efficiency and speed, ADR
has unsurprisingly and quickly gained enormous popularity and success in
virtually every area of law but criminal law. The thought of infringing upon
criminal defendants' rights have surely been the reason for this, but the risks
are overestimated when considering the frequency of plea-bargains in the
criminal justice process.
Unfortunately, the holdout on adopting a neutral ADR process for minor
crimes results in criminal defendants engaging in a plea-bargaining process
that consists, generally, of a poorly educated, often indigent individual,
negotiating with the government. The negotiation can hardly be referred to as
113 This is because it is unlikely that a recipient of nonjudicial punishment, even if
slightly dissatisfied with the punishment, would wish to take on the risk of being found
guilty (again) in court and stuck with a stiffer penalty than before.
171
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
such when such a disparity in bargaining power is present, yet more than
ninety-five percent of state cases settle through similar processes rather than
going to trial.
Because so many cases already settle, a system that more fairly disposes
of minor cases by diverting them outside the judicial system without
sacrificing speed, yet increasing efficiency, and of course freeing scarce
judicial resources, should seriously be considered by states. The model used
by the military for over half a century-nonjudicial punishment-would
provide exactly the relief state judicial systems need.
By examining the military's model of nonjudicial punishment, which
varies slightly in each branch, a readily adoptable system becomes apparent.
The procedural safeguards common among the branches, such as a
preliminary inquiry, notice, and a hearing, provide a starting point for
determining the procedure due the nonjudicial punishment recipient.
Additionally, military nonjudicial punishment regimes should serve as a
standard against which states can measure contemplated forms of
punishment. Despite critiques of the system as it exists in the military, state-
adoption subdues the potential issues raised, actually improving the process
as a result.
Finally, states can rest easy knowing that the adoption of such a
mechanism would not violate the Constitution. Defendants do not lose the
right to a trial simply because nonjudicial punishment is available to them.
Accordingly, defendants may elect to go to trial, but, should they choose to
avail themselves of nonjudicial punishment instead, they waive their right to
a trial, as well as the accompanying rights to a jury and counsel.1 4 This is
not a problem, constitutionally speaking, because nonjudicial punishment
does not trigger these rights, due to the nature of punishment being offered.
Accordingly, this superior method of disposing of certain instances of minor
criminal misconduct is available to any state interested, and its utilization
would be constitutional; therefore, states should adopt it.
114 Unless the state provides the right to counsel.
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